


# Comments on the paper on gas pricing provided by the EU experts for the RF- EU experts meeting in Moscow on June 26-27, 2012

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**11<sup>th</sup> round of informal Russia-EU experts Consultations on  
EU regulatory issues / 4<sup>th</sup> meeting of Work stream on  
internal markets, EU-Russia Gas Advisory Council,  
June 26-27, Moscow, Gazprom / Gazprom export**

# Gas Market development stages & pricing mechanisms

Figure 5: The Dynamics of Gas Markets Development




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Diversity of infrastructure & availability of alternative energy sources, both at producer end (alternative pipelines and markets, both geographical & new consuming industries) and consumer end (alternative supplies (gas-gas) & end-use substitution (gas vs. non-gas))

# Evolution of gas pricing mechanisms

- **Cost plus (net forward):**
  - Consumer takes the price – if no alternative supplies (gas & other energies) => price to cover the cost => price risk at the consumer end
- **(Net-back) replacement value based:**
  - Competitive energy market (gas to compete with other energies) => to link gas price to price of replacement fuels
  - $\text{NBRV (gas)} > \text{cost-plus (gas)} \Rightarrow \text{gas to be producible}$
  - $\text{NBRV (gas)} < \text{cost-plus (gas alternatives)} \Rightarrow \text{gas to be competitive}$
  - Price risk shifting from the consumer end to the producer end
  - If NBRV price linked to commodities (replacement fuels) – to increase frequency of its adaptations /price reviews => to be adaptable & flexible = to be competitive
- **Spot/futures (exchange based /commodities):**
  - Price risk has moved totally to the producer end of the gas value chain (from investor's angle) and is unpredictable (from trade's angle)
- **General conclusion: evolution of (gas) pricing mechanisms has been shifting price risk to the producer – BUT capital intensity (& unit capital value) of the upstream projects has been increasing due to worsening natural conditions of the fields (global general trend since edge 1960-ies/1970-ies) => disbalance between costs & price risks**

# Evolution of gas export pricing in Continental Europe & FSU/CIS



# Gas pricing: price indexation vs. spot/futures pricing – pros & contras (1)

Price indexation	Spot/futures pricing
Long-term stable non-interruptible gas supply with minimum costs & risks for both LTGEC parties => maximum marketable resource rent	Maximization of profit short-term => to earn on price fluctuations => maximum price fluctuations
Physical gas market => non-liquid, but more stable	Paper gas market => liquid, but less stable
Hedgers => mostly producers / traders of physical gas => limited & stable spectrum of participants	Speculators => mostly traders of gas contracts => inflow / outflow of financial players => open & unstable spectrum of participants


# Gas pricing: price indexation vs. spot/futures pricing – pros & contras (2)

Price indexation	Spot/futures pricing
Predictable contract prices => based on stable contractual formulas	Unpredictable spot prices & forward curves since based on frequently changing perceptions of global financial market players
Transparent formula & price review mechanisms <i>though</i> actual price not available to public immediately: (i) price calculated as function of formula ingredients, (ii) LTGEC confidentiality clauses	Transparent & immediate result (price quotations) <i>but</i> non-transparent & unclear decision-making mechanism on price levels (based on perceptions of big & unstable amount of players)

# Gas pricing: price indexation vs. spot/futures pricing – pros & contras (3)

Price indexation	Spot/futures pricing
Impossible to manipulate – fixed formula & contractual clauses; adaptation on bilateral basis within legally-binding procedure	Possibility to manipulate: (i) by direct price-manipulations, (ii) by influencing on expectations (perceptions) of market players
To soften price-peaks (narrow corridor of price fluctuations) => to stabilize gas market	To amplify price-peaks (expand corridor of price fluctuations) => to destabilize gas market
Price indexation (LTC) aimed at delivery	Spot/futures aimed at trade

# Producers, Consumers & Speculators Price/Pricing Preferences





# Results of J.Stern's FLAME polls on expected time of gas price decoupling from oil prices

**Table 1: When do you expect European long term contract gas prices will become decoupled from oil and determined by spot and futures prices? (% of total)**


YEAR OF CONFERENCE POLL:	2004	2005	2008	2009	2010
Before end 2010	24	15	8.7	3.8	4
Before end 2015	36	15	22.1	20.3	20
Later than 2015	15	39	42.5	44.3	51
Never	24	31	28.8	31.6	25

Source: FLAME Conference for respective years

Source: J.Stern. "Continental European Long-Term Gas Contracts: is a transition away from oil product-linked pricing inevitable and imminent?", OIES, NG34, September 2009, p.5; Ibid. "Gas Price Formation in Europe: rationale and next steps", Presentation at GMT, 8 October 2010.

# Future of LTGEC with indexation: industry view


## Q9 Oil-indexed long-term gas contracts are increasingly exposed to unprecedented take-or-pay pressures in Europe. Where are we heading?



Source: Europe's gas industry need transformation to adapt to energy revolution. Key messages from the 24<sup>th</sup> European Autumn Gas Conference, held in Bilbao in northern Spain in November 2009", December 2009, p.14.

# How to adapt LTGEC with indexation: industry view

**Q10 With an increasing number of long-term contracts under review pressure, how do you think this is most likely to be resolved, given the large amount of value embedded in them?**



Source: Europe's gas industry need transformation to adapt to energy revolution. Key messages from the 24<sup>th</sup> European Autumn Gas Conference, held in Bilbao in northern Spain in November 2009, December 2009, p.15.