Russia and Central Asia: Gas Pricing and Gas Pipelines

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
Presentation to the Atlantic Council of the United States, Washington DC, May 15, 2009

ACUS views on Caspian exports

- For the U.S., it would be reasonable to focus on solutions that provide to Caspian producers outlets to free markets, rather than lock them up in a long-term relationship with statecontrolled entities
- The U.S. and Europe should put their act together to give these countries better access to free, competitive energy markets.

Source: Boyko Nitzov. "Russian Oil and Gas Starts Flowing East", Published on Atlantic Council website (www.acus.org) 01 May 2009.


Pricing of Non-Renewable Energy Resources: RICARDIAN VS. HOTELLING RENT




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Slide 2

Russian Gas to Europe prior to January 4, 2006: "Political" and "Non-Political" Pricing Zones





Russian Gas to Europe: "Political" and "Non-Political" Pricing Zones 2006-2009 (Ukraine, post-Jan.4, 2006, & Belarus, post-Dec.30, 2006)



Slide 4

Russian Gas Export to Europe: Pricing Zones since Jan 1, 2009





Russia-Turkmen gas prices & pricing

- **2004-05**: 44 USD/mcm (Cost-plus-plus)
- **2006**: 74 USD/mcm (Cost-plus-plus)
- **2007**: 100 USD/mcm (Cost-plus-plus)
 - July: contract with CNPC for 30 BCM/y for 30 years since 2009;
 - Nov: statement on market sales principles since 2009
- 2008: 140 USD/mcm (Cost-plus-plus)
 - June: construction of Turkm.-Uzb.-Kazakh.-China gas pipeline started;
 - July: agreement with Russia to expand pre-Caspian (CAC-3) to 30 BCM/y
- 2009: 365 USD/mcm (annual? 1Q only?) (Net-back EU replacement value)
 - 25.03: Rus.-Turkm. agreement on East-West pipeline not signed (since Turkm. refused to merge it with expanded pre-Caspian pipeline);
 - 27.03: Turkm. announced international bidding for construction of East-West pipeline;
 - 08.04: explosion at Turkm. segment CAC-4 (drop of pressure by 90% due to (?) short advanced info from RF)
 - 21.04: Russian initiative on new international agreement (incl. on transit) instead of or amending Energy Charter
 - 23-24.04: Turkm.-UN international conference in Ashgabad on reliable transit; Turkmenistan prefers UN avenue (?)

Central Asian alternative (1)


- To sell its gas directly to Ukraine:
 - During 2005-2006 Russia-Ukraine gas dispute Ukraine was arguing for gas import price calculation on the basis of gas replacement value within Ukrainian domestic market, which is much lower that within EU market =>
 - If Ukraine to follow consistent policy regarding import gas pricing, it is to present the same pricing principles to Central Asian gas exporting states as well,
 - Export gas price at external border of Central Asian exporter, if calculated as net-back replacement value at the domestic Ukrainian market, will be relatively low

Central Asian alternative (2)

- To sell its gas to Ukraine via Russia:
 - Russia agreed to buy Central Asian gas at their external borders at the price calculated as netback replacement value at the EU market =>
 - Export price at external border of Central Asian exporter would be relatively high – higher then according to Ukrainian scenario (previous slide)
 - +
 - Russia contracted (booked) all export volumes of Central Asian gas and took all costs and risks of its transportation to the end-use markets

Central Asian alternative (3)


- Central Asian gas exporting states are willing to receive maximum Hotelling rent & to minimize export costs & risks =>
- It is more profitable for them to sell their gas to Russia at their external borders at the price, linked to gas replacement value at the EU market (maximization of Hotelling rent), with further Westward transportation of their gas by Gasprom (exclusion of risks & costs of transit), - compared to other options



Central Asia gas export potential

State	2009 export, BCM	Max export potential, BCM	
Turkm enistan	50	110-115	S.Yalotan up to 75 BCM; 15-20 BCM offshore
Uzbeki stan	15	40-45	Up to 15 BCM Lukoil Overseas & to 10-15 Karshi
Kazak hstan	11	32	Mostly due to Kashagan, Tengiz & Karachaganak
Azerba ijan	8	15-20	Mostly due to production increase at Shah-Deniz

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Pipelines:

Acting via Russia (CAC 1-4) to Europe

Pre-Caspian to Russia (CAC-3) to be expanded

To be constructed (East-West Turkmen)

Being constructed to China (via Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan)

Discussed to Europe (Trans-Caspian and via Iran)

To Iran

Discussed to India-Pakistan via Afghanistan

Turkmenistan: 5 export options

N	Pipeline	Capacity	
1	To China	Up to 30 BCM/y	Start operation 2010; 100% financing by China
2	Via Russia Westward	42.5+30 BCM/y	Current volume + pre-Caspian (expansion CAC-3)
3	By-passing Russia to EU	Up to 31 BCM/y	Nabucco; connection either via trans-Caspian or via Iran;
4	To Iran	Up to 14 BCM/y	Currently 8
5	To India- Pakistan via Afghanistan	Up to 20 BCM/y	Highly speculative due to high transit risks & political instability

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Central Asian Gas at Competitive Eurasian markets

For Turkmenistan: Routes 1 & 3 = access to fastest growing and biggest Eurasian gas market (2010) Route 2 = proven by historical practice least risky (on-border sales) access to mature EU market with highest prices (2009) Route 4 = no more price stimuli compared to Route 2 (2009) Route 5 = most risky & unpredictable

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South Stream and Nabucco



South

Stream

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Nabucco

- Procedure re access to capacity in place, but
- Still no shipping contracts and/or proved reserves committed to deliveries via Nabucco, plus
- Competition with other pipelines for gas of Shah-Deniz-II, plus
- No go for Trans-Caspian (delimitation) and via Iran (US embargo + conflict of interests) pipelines
- EU structures ready to finance at minimum pre-investment stages, but
- No dedication from private investors to invest until supplies are contracted and LTGECs are signed

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Thank you for your attention !

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